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Randall: Berman v. Allan

COMMENT
BERMAN v. ALLAN
ToRTS--Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life-Where negligence of
physicians precludes patient's right to abort mongoloid child, par-

ents have limited cause of action for wrongful birth, but child has
no cause of actionfor wrongful life. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
Remembering my birth in infancy, the coughs,
The swallows, the tear-trees growing
From your eyeballs of shame; the gray
Immense morning I was conceived i the womb,
And the red gory afternoon delivered
therefrom. 1
In recent years, courts have been confronted with an increasing number of tort actions 2 claiming that the birth of a child
has created compensable injury. Parents have filed "wrongful
birth" actions where a physician performed an unsuccessful sterilization operationa or abortion, 4 and where a physician failed to inform parents of the increased possibility that the mother would
1. J. KEROUAC, MEXIco CrrY BLUES 89 (1959) (89th Chorus).
2. Such claims have also given rise to actions based on contract. E.g. Shaheen
v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming County 1957).
3. Most courts now recognize a wrongful birth cause of action in this context.
E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st Dist. 1967); Sard
v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92,
247 N.W.2d 409 (1976); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976);
cf. Green v. Sudakin. 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (failure to inform
parents that scheduled sterilization operation was never performed). But see Rogala v.
Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571 (1st Dist. 1973). See generally Comment,
Pregnancy After Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J. FAM. L.
635 (1972-1973). Suits have also been brought against pharmacists for allegedly
misfilling a birth control prescription. E.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511 (1st Div. 1971) (cause of action recognized). The term "wrongful birth"
is of recent vintage.
4. It is only in recent years that wrongful birth actions arising in this context
have been brought. E.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1st Dist. 1976) (cause of action recognized).
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give birth to a child suffering from birth defects. 5 In the latter
case, the parents allege that the physician's negligence deprived
them of the opportunity to make an informed decision about
whether to have the child. 6 Children have filed claims for "wrongful life" in two basic situations. In one context, an action is brought
by an illegitimate child against his or her parents because they
caused the child to suffer the consequences of illegitimacy. 7 Actions have also been brought against physicians by children with
severe birth defects. They allege that had the defendant informed
their parents of the increased possibility of birth defects, the paraborted the fetus and spared the child the pains of
ents would have
8
impaired life.
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,9 decided by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in 1967, was the archetypal decision involving wrongful birth
5. Actions of this variety have recently been recognized. E.g., Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (37 year old pregnant woman with greater chance of giving birth to deformed child not tested by physician); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977) (negligent
genetic counseling regarding hereditary kidney disease), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975) (physician failed to diagnose pregnant woman's contraction of rubella); Dumer
v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (physician failed to diagnose pregnant woman's contraction of rubella). But see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (no cause of action where physician fails to inform pregnant woman with rubella of risk to fetus of birth defects); but of. Howard v. Lecher,
42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (no cause of action where
parents uninformed of risk that their child would be born with Tay-Sachs disease)
(duty owed only to child, not parents). See also Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 53 A.D.2d
523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1st Dep't 1976) (cause of action recognized, but standard of
reasonable care not breached by not informing mother about amniocentesis procedure), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977).
6. Additionally, wrongful birth claims have been brought by the older siblings
of a child allegedly born due to the defendant's negligence. The basis of such a
claim is that the additional child will reduce the older siblings' share of parental income, love, and attention. E.g., Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (cause of action not recognized).
7. E.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1963)
(cause of action dismissed), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). See also Williams v.
State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (cause of action for wrongful
life sustained where illegitimate sued state mental hospital alleging that hospital's
negligence allowed her mother to be raped), rev'd, 25 A.D.2d 907, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786
(3d Dep't), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966). Courts
have only recently begun to use the term "wrongful life."
8. These actions have been routinely rejected. E.g., Smith v. United States, 392
F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689
(1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978);
Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (4th Dep't 1977).
9. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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and wrongful life. 10 Ms. Gleitman alleged that her physicians negligently misinformed her that her contraction of rubella during early
pregnancy would have no effect on her fetus." Relying on this ad-

vice, Ms. Gleitman did not have an abortion' 2 and subsequently

gave birth to a child whose sight, hearing, and speech were severely

impaired. 13 The court ruled that neither the parents' wrongful
birth claim nor the infant's wrongful life claim was a legally cognizable cause of action.' 4 Twelve years later, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Berman v. Allan' 5 reassessed the validity of the Gleitman
holdings. 16 Berman overruled Gleitman in part by recognizing a
limited wrongful birth cause of action for the parents,' 7 but it continued to deny the infant's wrongful life claim.' 8 While Berman
represents a necessary step forward, this Comment will show that
by limiting the parents' wrongful birth claim and dismissing the in-

fant's action for wrongful life, the Berman decision does not advance sufficiently beyond its predecessor.
THE

FACTS OF BERMAN V. ALLAN

Thirty-eight year old Shirley Berman gave birth to a daughter afflicted with Down's Syndrome (mongolism).1 9 Suit was subsequently filed against her obstetricians, 20 alleging that since a
woman of Ms. Berman's age stands a greater chance of giving birth
to a mongoloid, 21 the defendants were negligent in failing to in-

10.

See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Mi-

chael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 772-73, 233 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (1975); Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL. U.L. REV.
127, 156 (1978).
11. 49 N.J. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. At trial, expert medical testimony on
plaintiff's behalf stated that "women who have German measles in the first trimester
of their pregnancy will produce infants with birth defects in 20 to 50 per cent of the
cases." Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690. The defendant's medical expert estimated that the
likelihood of birth defects in this situation was "some 20 to 25 per cent." Id. at 26,
227 A.2d at 691.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
14. Id. at 29, 31, 227 A.2d at 692-93.
15. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
16. Id. at 423, 404 A.2d at 9-10.
17. Id. at 430-34, 404 A.2d at 13-15.
18. Id. at 426-30, 404 A.2d at 11-13.
19. Id. at 423-24, 404 A.2d at 10.
20. Berman v. Allan, No. L1447-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1977), rev'd in part,
80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). For a discussion of the case's disposition on remand,
see note 78 infra.
21. 80 N.J. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10. Medical studies indicate that "about 60% of
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form Ms. Berman of the existence of a procedure known as
amniocentesis. 22 This procedure can detect the presence of such
chromosomal defects in the fetus as the genetic anomaly causing
mongolism. 23 No allegation was made that the defendants caused
the mongolism itself. Rather, the Bermans alleged that the defendants' negligence deprived them of the opportunity to make an
informed decision about whether to abort the fetus.
Since the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' suit for failing to state
a valid cause of action, 24 the supreme court accepted the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construed all inferences in the
plaintiffs' favor.25 Thus, the court assumed that the defendants
failed to inform Ms. Berman about amniocentesis 26 and that this
did not conform to accepted medical procedure. 27 It also assumed
that had Ms. Berman been informed of the availability of
amniocentesis, she would have submitted to the procedure, 28 and
upon learning that the child would be afflicted with Down's Syndrome, would have aborted the fetus. 29 The court determined,
therefore, that the only question before it was whether damages
should be awarded as a matter of law in these circumstances. 30
THE PaMNTrs' WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIM

Gleitman's dismissal of the parents' wrongful birth claim was
premised on two rationales: The impossibility of measuring damages 31 and public policy against abortions. 32 In support of the first
all mongoloid babies are born to mothers above 35 years of age." NAr'L ACAD. OF
ScI., GENETIC SCREENING 134 (1975). See generally id. at 133-37.
22. 80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10.
23. For a description of amniocentesis-which involves inserting a long needle
into the mother's uterus and sampling the amniotic fluid-see Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92, 97-99 (1974); Note, Father and
Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic
Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1493 n.21 (1978). The Berman court wrote: "Recent
studies indicate that amniocentesis is highly accurate in predicting the presence of
chromosomal defects, and that the risk of even minor damage to mother or fetus
deriving from the procedure is less than one percent." 80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10
(citations omitted).
24. Berman v. Allan, No. L1447-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1977), rev'd in part,
80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
25. 80 N.J. at 425-26, 404 A.2d at 11.
26. Id. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
32. Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
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rationale, the Gleitman majority explained that to determine the
parents' compensatory damages, "a court would have to evaluate
the denial to them of the intangible, unmeasurable, and complex
human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and weigh these
against the alleged emotional and money injuries. Such a proposed
weighing is . . . impossible to perform.- 33 The Berman court
rejected this reasoning, ruling that "to deny Mr. and Mrs. Berman
redress for their injuries merely because damages cannot be measured with precise exactitude would constitute a perversion of fundamental principles of justice." 34 The court cited several cases for
the proposition that the impossibility of measuring damages is an
insufficient rationale for dismissing a complaint. 35 Since all of these
cases predate Gleitman, the Berman opinion implies that Gleitman
was unjustified in relying on the impossibility of measuring damages as a basis for rejecting wrongful birth actions. This casts doubt
on the validity of decisions that cite and rely on Gleitman's
impossibility-of-measuring-damages rationale to reject wrongful
36
birth claims.
The Gleitman majority also relied on public policy against
abortion. 37 It dismissed as irrelevant the question of the abortion's
legality, writing that even if an abortion could have been legally
obtained, "substantial policy reasons prevent this Court from allowing tort damages for the denial of the opportunity to take an
embryonic life." 38 This policy reflects the sanctity of life as expressed by the basic human will to live: "to seek life and hold on
to it however heavily burdened." 39 The court therefore assumed
that the infant would have chosen life with defects over no life at
all. It quoted from Theocritus' Idyll: " 'For the living there is
hope, but for the dead there is none.' "40 Reasoning from these assumptions, the court concluded that "[t]he right to life is inalienable in our society. A court cannot say what defects should prevent
33. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
34. 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 15 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 428, 433, 404 A.2d at 12, 15 (citing Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136
A.2d 626 (1957); Jenkins v. Pennsylvania R.R., 67 N.J.L. 331, 51 A. 704 (1902)). For a
discussion of this rationale as it relates to wrongful life, see text accompanying notes
87 & 88 infra.
36. E.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 13 (Del. 1975); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502,- 503-04 (2d Dep't 1970),
aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
37. 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Theocritus, IDYLL ch. IV, 42). Maybe only the living need it.
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an embryo from being allowed life such that denial of the opportunity to terminate the existence of a defective child in embryo can
support a cause for action." 41 Berman rejected this rationale,
relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade42 that a
woman has a constitutional right during the first trimester of pregnancy to decide whether to abort her fetus. 43 Berman stated that
given Roe, public policy now supports the'view that a woman can44
not be denied a meaningful opportunity to make that decision.
Therefore, someone who negligently deprives a woman of her constitutional right to an abortion is liable for the damages proximately
caused.45 The court concluded that "[any other ruling would in effect immunize from liability those in the medical field providing inadequate guidance to persons who would choose to exercise their
constitutional right to abort fetuses which, if born, would suffer
46
from genetic defects."
Despite the court's outright rejection of Gleitman's rationales
for not recognizing wrongful birth, Berman significantly limited the
scope of recovery for the tort. The Bermans sought two items of
damage: "(1) the medical and other costs that will be incurred in
order to properly raise, supervise and educate the child; and (2)
compensation for the emotional anguish that has been and will continue to be experienced on account of [the infant's] condition." 47
The court recogrized the claim for emotional anguish, 48 but re49
jected the claim for child rearing costs.
The basis of the parents' claim for child rearing costs was that
but for the defendants' malpractice, the Bermans would have
aborted the fetus and would not have incurred the expenses of raising a child.50 The sole explanation given by the Berman majority
for holding that this item of damage should not be awarded is the
following:
In essence, Mr. and Mrs. Berman desire to retain all the benefits inhering in the birth of the child-i.e., the love and joy they
will experience as parents-while saddling defendants with the
41. Id.
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Id. at 162-66.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

80 N.J. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 14.
Id.
Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14 (citations omitted).
Id. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
Id. at 433-34, 404 A.2d at 14-15.
Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
Id. at 430-31, 404 A.2d at 13.
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enormous expenses attendant upon her rearing. Under the facts
and circumstances here alleged, we find that such an award
would be wholly disproportionate to the culpability involved,
and that allowance of such a recovery would both constitute a
windfall to the parents and place too unreasonable a financial
burden upon physicians.51
This reasoning is replicative of the holding in Shaheen v.
Knight,5 2 which for many years was the classic decision rejecting a
claim for wrongful birth in the context of an unsuccessful sterilization procedure. 53 In Shaheen, the plaintiff fathered a child despite
having undergone a vasectomy. 54 In a suit by the father against the
physician, the court denied child rearing costs, holding that "[t]o
allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that the physician
would have to pay for the fun, joy and affection which plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and education of this, [plaintiff's] fifth
child." 5 5 Shaheen rested on the conclusion that as a matter of law
the joys of parenthood outweigh the expenses and costs of raising a
child. 56 The rationale for this "overriding benefits" theory is that
the birth of a healthy child is always considered a joyous event.
Berman's adherence to Shaheen-like reasoning-which has
been rejected by other jurisictions5 7-- is inappropriate. First, an
overriding-benefits theory has less applicability when the parents'
child is deformed. The Berman court, however, ruled that even in
the case of a mongoloid child, awarding child rearing costs would
"constitute a windfall to the parents." 5 8 It ignored the
possibility
that having a child with extreme birth defects might well shift the
ratio of parenthood's burdens and benefits so that the former outweighs the latter. Moreover, irrespective of the infant's health, it
was inappropriate for the court to assume that the Bermans would
benefit from being parents. It can no longer be said that the birth
51. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14 (citations omitted).
52.

11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming County 1957).

53. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Minn. 1977). Shaheen and Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), another
widely cited unsuccessful sterilization case, have now both been roundly rejected by
more modem reasoning. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 325, 59
Cal. Rptr. 463, 476-77 (1st Dist. 1967); cf.Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 247-49,
187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1st Div. 1971) (negligent filling of birth control prescription).

54.

11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 41.

55.
56.

Id. at 45-46.
See Robertson, Civil Liability Arising from "'WrongfulBirth" Following an

Unsuccessful SterilizationOperation, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 149-52 (1978).
57.
58.

See cases note 53 supra.
80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14 (citations omitted).
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of a child is always a blessing. Six years ago the dissenting opinion
in Terrell v. Garcia,59 a Texas case rejecting a wrongful birth cause

of action, argued that
[t]he question is not whether a doctor should be forced "to pay
for the satisfaction and joy and affection which normal parents
would ordinarily have in the rearing and education of a healthy
child." The question is whether a negligent doctor should be
held responsible for the consequences of his negligence. There is
no basis for the assumption that plaintiffs ... will derive any joy
and satisfaction from the raising of the unwanted child.6 0

Today, in light of the holding in Roe v. Wade, 6 1 the recent repeal
of the New Jersey abortion statute, 62 and the Supreme Court's recognition of an individual's right to use contraceptives,

63

people

have the right to determine for themselves the relative burdens
and benefits of parenthood.6 4 Inherent in the right of abortion is
the right of would-be parents to decide that they want neither the
so-called benefits of parenthood nor the burdensome costs of raising a child. 65 Although the Bermans may have purposefully conceived the infant, the court assumed that but for the defendants'
breach of reasonable care, Ms. Berman would have decided to
59. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 4th Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927

(1974).
60. Id. at 129 (Cadena, J., dissenting) (quoting Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402,
406 (Tex. Civ. App. 11th Dist. 1972)). The dissenting judge in Terrell also wrote:
Perhaps these parents, in deciding that they did not want to pay the price
for the enjoyment and pleasures which "normal" parents would derive from
the birth of an unwanted child, were not acting as "normal" persons.... [Ilt
is hornbook law that a tort feasor must take his victim as he finds him and
has no right to insist on a "normal" victim.
Id. at 129-30 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
61. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
62. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (West 1969) (repealed 1979):
Any person who, maliciously or without lawful justification, with intent to
cause or procure the miscarriage of a pregnant woman, administers or prescribes or advises or directs her to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or noxious thing, or uses any instrument or means whatever, is guilty of
a high misdemeanor.
See generally Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641 (1976)
(woman has federal constitutional right to abort fetus during first trimester of pregnancy), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1978).
63. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
64. "It is no answer to say that a result which claimant specifically sought to
avoid, might be regarded as a blessing by someone else." Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.
2d 157, 162 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (negligent tubal ligation).
65. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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abort the fetus. 66 The Berman court's denial of child rearing costs
discounts Ms. Berman's constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy and reinflates the Shaheen "blessing balloon." 67
Berman's denial of all child rearing costs is not supported by
decisions in other jurisdictions that have recognized wrongful birth.
While some courts, such as the New York Court of Appeals, 68 have
allowed parents to recover all the expenses of raising the child,
other courts have utilized approaches that award at least some of
these costs. One such approach is to award parents the costs of
parenthood's economic burdens, less the value of its benefits. 69 For
instance, the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that "the benefits
of the unplanned child may be weighed against all the elements of
claimed damage." 70 A second approach, utilized by the Texas Supreme Court, awarded the parents the value of the "economic burden related solely to the physical defects of the child." 71 These two
66. 80 N.J. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11.
67. See generally Note, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liability for the Birth of
an Unplanned Child, 39 ALB. L. REv. 221 (1975). The Shaheen "blessing balloon"
has been "burst" by other jurisdictions. See cases note 53 supra.
68. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412-15, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813-14, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 901-03 (1978).
69. E.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 254-55, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517-19
(1st Div. 1971). The court quoted from the first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920, at
616 (1939):
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to
his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of
the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920, at 520 (1977). The "offsetting

benefits rule"-by which the plaintiff's recovery is mitigated by the benefits
conferred upon the plaintiff to the interest that was harmed-is not to be confused
with the "overriding benefits" theory, see text accompanying notes 51-60 supra, by
which it is said that the benefits of parenthood as a matter of law outweigh the burdens of parenthood. The former is a rule of damages; the latter, a rule of public policy. Robertson, supra note 56, at 150. For a discussion of mitigating damages by putting the infant up for adoption, which the Berman court did not discuss, see
Comment, Liability for Failureof Birth Control Methods, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1187,
1202-04 (1976). Of course, it would be more difficult for an adoption agency to place
an abnormal child, such as infant Berman.
An evaluation of the burdens less the benefits of parenthood is not without its
difficulties. However, the Berman court rejected Gleitman's "impossibility of
measuring damages" rationale as a basis for dismissing the parents' complaint. See
text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. For an indepth discussion of the complexities
of such an evaluation, see Note, supra note 10, at 145-64.
70. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1st Div.
1971). In applying the "offsetting benefits rule," the Troppi court did not separate
the plaintiffs' claims for child rearing costs and the damages suffered as a result of
the emotional anguish caused by the pregnancy and childbirth. Id.
71. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975). The Jacobs court
wrote:
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approaches do compromise a woman's right to decide that she
wants neither the benefits nor the burdens of parenthood, but they
are preferable to a denial of all child rearing costs.
The Bermans also sought to recover for the emotional anguish
of having a mongoloid child. 72 The court held that "the monetary
equivalent of this distress is an appropriate measure of the harm
suffered by the parents deriving from Mrs. Berman's loss of her
right to abort the fetus." 7 3 Just as the court's total denial of child
rearing costs is atypical of decisions recognizing wrongful birth, the
court's recognition of damages for emotional suffering is unusual.
Courts recognizing wrongful birth claims have generally restricted recovery to some child rearing costs, denying damages for
emotional suffering on duty and speculativeness grounds. 74 Berman
met these arguments by referring to the increasing number of situ75
ations in which tort law compensates the emotionally injured.
The majority explained that "courts have come to recognize that
mental and emotional distress is just as 'real' as physical pain, and
that its valuation is no more difficult." 76 Moreover, the court stated
that to deny redress for emotional anguish "merely because damages cannot be measured with precise exactitude would constitute
77
a perversion of fundamental principles of justice."
Recognizing the parents' claim for emotional damages represents progress in compensating parents for the loss of their right to
make an informed decision regarding an abortion. This progress,
however, pales in light of the court's denial of all child rearing
It is impossible for us to justify a policy which at once deprives the parents

of information by which they could elect to terminate the pregnancy likely
to produce a child with defective body, a policy which in effect requires that

the deficient embryo be carried to full gestation until the deficient child is
born, and which policy then denies recovery from the tortfeasor of costs of
treating and caring for the defects of the child.
Id. See generally Kass & Shaw, The Risk of Birth Defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and
Parents'Right to Know, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 213 (1976-1977).

72. 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
73. Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14 (citation omitted).

74. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412-15, 386 N.E.2d 807,
813-14, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901-03

1978); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366

N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (parents cannot recover for emotional suffering
caused by death of their daughter from Tay-Sachs disease) (duty owed only to child,
not parents). But see Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st
Dist. 1967).
75. 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 15. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54,

at 327-35 (4th ed. 1971).
76.
77.

80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 15 (citations omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
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costs. The majority never explained why the benefits of parenthood
outweigh the "'enormous expenses" of raising a mongoloid child,,
but not the emotional suffering. Berman's limitation of wrongful
birth recovery represents a cautious first step towards recognizing a
cause of action for wrongful birth. 78
THE INFANT'S WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIM

Infant Sharon Berman filed a wrongful life action seeking compensation for the physical and emotional pain and suffering of being a mongoloid. 79 She claimed that but for the defendants' negligence she would not have been born and, thus, would not have been
forced to bear the burdens of mongolism. 80 Utilizing a traditional
tort formula, the Berman court stated that these damages would be
computed by comparing the condition the infant would have been
in but for the defendants' negligence-nonlife-with the infant's
present impaired condition.8 1 Consistent with Gleitman82 and the
wrongful life decisions of other jurisdictions, 8 3 the Berman court
dismissed the infant's claim. 8 4 Berman's rationale, however, dif-

fered from Gleitman's.
The Gleitman court dismissed the infant's wrongful life action
because of the impossibility of weighing impaired life against
nonlife. 85 Just as Berman rejected this rationale when considering
78. On remand to the superior court, plaintiffs were permitted to proceed on
the claim for emotional injury. The jury ultimately found for defendants because
amniocentesis was not a widely accepted procedure at the time of Ms. Berman's
pregnancy. Therefore, the failure to inform Ms. Berman about the procedure did not
breach the standard of care owed to her. Berman v. Allan, No. L1447-75 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Jan. 18, 1980).
79. See 80 N.J. at 427, 404 A.2d at 11-12. Mongolism is "[a] syndrome of mental
retardation associated with a variable constellation of abnormalities." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 791 (22d ed. 1972). For a further description of the mental and
physical effects of mongolism, see text accompanying notes 107-112 infra.
80. 80 N.J. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11. As in the case of the parents' claim, the infant did not contend that the defendants' negligence caused the defects with which
she was born.
81. Id. at 427, 404 A.2d at 11-12.
82. 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
83. E.g., Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
84. 80 N.J. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
85. 49 N.J. at 28-29, 227 A.2d at 692. While the Gleitman opinion stated that its
rationale for dismissing the wrongful life claim was the "impossibility of measuring
damages," id., and the Berman court viewed Gleitman's wrongful life rationale as
such, 80 N.J. at 14, 404 A.2d at 431-32, the anti-abortion attitude expressed in
Gleitman's wrongful birth section may have pervaded the court's wrongful life thinking as well. In this light, consider the following statement made by the Gleitman
court in its wrongful birth section:
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the parents' claim, 86 the court discarded it as a basis for denying
the infint's. The court stated that "where a wrong itself is of such a
nature as to preclude the computation of damages with precise exactitude, it would be a 'perversion of fundamental principles of
justice to deny all relief to the injured [party].' "87 Berman stated
that "were the measure of damages our sole concern, it is possible
that some judicial remedy could be fashioned which would redress
plaintiff, if only in part, for injuries suffered." 88 Instead, the
Berman court dismissed the wrongful life claim because as a matter of law the plaintiff had not suffered any damage by being
born.8 9 This is because "[o]ne of the most deeply held beliefs of
our society is that life-whether experienced with or without a major physical handicap-is more precious than non-life." 90 Berman
set forth three "concrete manifestations" 9' of this belief: (1) Documents such as the federal and New Jersey constitutions that set
forth the moral principles of our society "are replete with references to the sanctity of life," 92 and there is no indication in these
documents that impaired lives are less valuable. 93 (2) The most severe criminal penalties are reserved for defendants who have deprived others of life, and these defendants are accorded special
procedural protections. 94 These "protections and penalties do not
vary according to the presence or absence of physical deformities
in the victim or defendant. " 95 (3) Society holds physicians in high
esteem because they are the preservers of life. 96
The sanctity of the single human life is the decisive factor in this suit in tort.
...
We are not talking here about the breeding of prize cattle. It may have

been easier for the mother and less expensive for the father to have terminated the life of their child while he was an embryo, but these alleged detriments cannot stand against the preciousness of the single human life to support a remedy in tort.
49 N.J. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693 (citations omitted).

86. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
87. 80 N.J. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12 (brackets in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563

(1931)).
88.
89.
90.

Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 428-29, 404 A.2d at 12 (citations omitted).
Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12 (citations omitted).

91. Id.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
sanctity

Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1).
Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12-13.
Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 13.
Id. at 429-30, 404 A.2d at 13.
Id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13. This particular "concrete manifestation" of the
of life is misplaced in an action for malpractice.
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The question before the court was whether the infant's impaired life outweighs nonlife. 97 Berman's three examples of the
sanctity of life are unresponsive to the infant's claim. The constitutional rights and protections listed by the court go to the individual's right to exist and his or her relationship with the state and
other individuals. Therefore, while these rights and protections apply equally to those with and without birth defects, they do not
measure the value of life itself when measured against nonlife. It is
not the right to exist that is reduced by bir.h defects, but the value
of life to the individual. It is possible to recognize that life's value
has been diminished without reducing the individual's right to autonomy and privacy.
Berman based its dismissal of the child's cause of action on the
sanctity of life. The court held that
[nlotwithstanding her affliction with Down's Syndrome, Sharon,
by virtue of her birth, will be able to love and be loved and to
experience happiness and pleasure-emotions which are truly
the essence of life and which are far more valuable than the suffering she may endure. To rule otherwise would require us to
disavow the basic assumptions upon which our society is based.
This we cannot do. 98
While the court appears to balance the values of life and nonlife, it
uses the fact of birth to decide that life will always be preferable.
The court's concluding sentences refer back to its sanctity of life
arguments, which are based on the value of life in the abstract.
According to the court, birth is sufficient to give that abstraction meaning. The holding, therefore, makes the mere fact of existence dispositive. The court discusses the meaning of existence in
terms of the ability to love and be loved. That experience has no
meaning, however, if it is possible by birth alone. It is the ability
to experience pain, pleasure, and hope that gives those words and
life meaning. Thus, mere existence is but a starting point for further analysis.
The abstract value we place on life is not reduced by the argument that nonlife outweighs impaired life. The infant's cause of action only requires a court to recognize that the burdens of impaired life, when weighed against the reduced benefits derived

97. See id. at 427, 404 A.2d at 11-12.
98. Id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13 (emphasis added).
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from it, make nonlffe a more rational alternative. 9 9 The sanctity of
life is not diluted; rather, it is strengthened by recognizing that
birth defects can so reduce life's pleasures and emphasize its pains,

that in certain circumstances nonlife becomes preferable. 00 Similarly, can it be rationally argued that the pain of a terminal cancer
patient's existence during the last few weeks before death is better

than nonlife?' 0 Ending that life does not denigrate life, but ele2
0
vates it.1

The burdens of mongolism may make nonlife preferable. 10 3
99. A recent commentary states:
[T]he plaintiff in a wrongful life action, because he must demonstrate that
he has been harmed by being born, must establish that nonexistence would
have been preferable to life as he must live it .... If nonexistence is valueless, then whether the infant-plaintiff has been harmed by being born depends upon whether his existence has a positive or a negative value. To determine this, the court must weigh the benefits and the burdens of that
existence. If the burdens outweigh the benefits, then the plaintiff has been
harmed by being born.
Note, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing Judicial Development of the Theory of
"'WrongfulLife," 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 211, 226-27 (1978).
100. A number of commentators on wrongful life have expressed the view that
"there should be a point at which life under sufficiently adverse conditions" cannot
be assumed to be more desirable than nonlife. E.g., Comment, Torts-Illegitimate
Child Denied Recovery Against Fatherfor "Wrongful Life," 49 IOwA L. REV. 1005,
1009 (1964). One such commentator explains that "in certain situations it would be
preferable not to exist rather than to endure life incapacitated by severe physical and
mental defects." Note, A Cause of Action For "Wrongful Life": [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 66 (1970).
101. See generally 0. RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE 35-50 (1975).
102. In this light, consider Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court upheld a probate court's order that life-prolonging chemotherapy should not
be administered to a mentally retarded man, who would not have been able to understand the pain associated with the therapy. See generally In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). For discussion of the distinction between acts of omission
and acts of commission that are responsible for the death of a terminally ill patient,
see Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily
Integrity Versus the Preservationof Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973); Fletcher,
ProlongingLife, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1006-08 (1967); Note, Informed Consent and
the Dying Patient,83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1647-50 (1974).
103. An oft-cited commentary renders the following "relative values" for cases
where the infant suffers severe defects:
Life without defects = a plus value (+)
Nonexistence = 0

Life with [severe] defects = a minus value (-).
Note, supra note 100, at 66. The commentator explains that his analysis "assumes
that life without defects is to be desired most," although life may not be preferable
where the infant has severe defects. Id. With reference to the "relative values" he
has conceived, the commentator writes:
Once the relative plus, minus and zero values have been established, a compensatory figure could be ascertained by the court. This would be no more
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Mongoloids are mentally retarded, the majority being imbeciles

with I.Q.s of twenty-five to forty-nine. 10 4 Rarely exceeding a men-

tal age of six years, 10 5 mongoloids never share in the appreciation
normal people have for their world. Brain defects reduce the mon-

goloid's sensory perception, particularly touch and smell. 10 6 Many
suffer from leukemia, 10 7 heart disease, 10 8 impaired respiration and

circulation, 10 9 and reduced life expectancy."
defects-including

-plague

abnormal

hands,"'

0

An array of physical

feet,"

2

and genitals"

3

mongoloids. Therefore, there is none of the hope to

which Gleitman alluded."

4

Given the benefits and burdens of

mongolism, it is not necessarily true that as a matter of law life as
a mongoloid outweighs nonlife.
Judge Handler, dissenting from the dismissal of the wrongful

life claim, argued that the defendants' negligence prevented the
parents from preparing themselves for the burdens of raising a

mongoloid chld."

5

He explained that the infant's "injury consists

of a diminished childhood in being born of parents kept ignorant of

her defective state while unborn and who, on that account, were
less fit to accept and assume their parental responsibilities. "116 This
diminished capacity is aggravated by the child's birth defects,
which place demands on the parents beyond those borne by the
parents of healthy children." 7 Judge Handler saw no difference

between this diminished capacity and the diminished parental cadifficult than placing a monetary value upon the difference between living
with two arms as compared with living with only one--when the other has
been severed due to negligence of defendant.
Id.
104. See L. PENROSE & G. SMITH, DoWN's ANOMALY 48-53 (1966).
105. C. BENDA, DowN's SYNDROME 247-49 (rev. ed. 1969).
106. L. PENROSE & G. SMITH, supra note 104, at 53-54.
107. Id. at 81-83, A. LILIENFELD & C. BENESCH, EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MONGOLISM 85-93 (1969).
108. C. BENDA, supra note 105, at 38; L. PENROSE & G. SMITH, supra note 104,
at 26-30; Kirman, Down's Syndrome, in 1 MENTAL RETARDATION 57, 65 (J. Wortis
ed. 1970).
109. R. TREDGOLD & K. SODDY, TEXTBOOK OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY (SUBNORMALITY) 292 (10th ed. 1963).
110. L. PENROSE & G. SMITH, supra note 104, at 26-30.
111. R. TREDGOLD & K. SODDY, supra note 109, at 291-92.
112. Id. at 292.
113. Id.; C. BENDA, supra note 105, at 33.
114. See 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693; text accompanying notes 39 & 40 supra.
115. 80 N.J. at 442, 404 A.2d at 19 (Handler, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Handler, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Handler, J., dissenting).
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pacity resulting from injuries sustained in an automobile accident,
for which a cause of action has long existed in New Jersey. 118
Wrongful life claims arise in varied contexts. Where the infant
plaintiff is severely deformed, the question of whether his or her
life outweighs nonlife should be fact sensitive. Rather than dismiss
infant Berman's claim, the court should have allowed her complaint
to stand and permitted her to prove at trial that nonlife outweighs
her impaired life.
Although supported by the decisions of other courts, Berman's
dismissal of the infant's claim is particularly troublesome. While
the majority of courts now award parents at least some child
rearing costs in a wrongful birth action, the Berman court completely denied the parents' claim for these costs. The net result of
Berman's wrongful birth and wrongful life holdings is that no provision has been made for the maintenance of the mongoloid child. As
Judge Jacobs' dissent in Gleitman put it,
[Wlhile logical objection may be advanced to the child's standing
and injury, logic is not the determinative factor and should not
be permitted to obscure that he has to bear the frightful weight

of his abnormality throughout life, and that such compensation
as is received from the defendants or either of them should be
dedicated primarily to his care and the lessening of his difficulties."

19

CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Supreme Court in Berman v. Allan came to
bury Gleitman, not to praise it.120 In the end, however, Gleitman's
holdings remain with us, uninterred and rejuvenated. While
Berman held that the parents could recover for their emotional suffering, no provision was made for child rearing costs or the frightful existence that infant Berman must now lead. Where a physician
negligently precludes parents from making an informed decision
about whether to have an abortion, and as a result an infant is
born with severe birth defects, it is unresponsive to the needs of
the parents and infant to limit recovery to the parents' emotional
suffering.
Kenneth C. Randall
118. Id. at 442-43, 404 A.2d at 19-20 (Handler, J., dissenting).
119. 49 N.J. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
120. W. SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, scene 2 (Marc Anthony to populace).
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